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The idea of quantity  
at the origin of the legitimacy of 
mathematization in physics 
 
 
Michel PATY* 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 Newton's use of mathematics in mechanics was justified by him from his neo-
platonician conception of the physical world that was going along with his «absolute, 
true and mathematical concepts» such as space, time, motion, force, etc. But physics, 
afterwards, although it was based on newtonian dynamics, meant differently the 
legitimacy of being mathematized, and this difference can be seen already in the 
works of eighteenth century «Geometers» such as Euler, Clairaut and d'Alembert 
(and later on Lagrange, Laplace and others). Despite their inheritance of Newton's 
achievements, they understood differently the meaning and use of mathematical 
quantities for physics, in a way that was more neutral to metaphysics.  
 The continental reception and assimilation of Newton's Principia  had indeed 
occured as its budding onto Leibniz’ calculus and a cartesian conception of rationality 
(spread in particular by the malebranchist disciples of Leibniz). This new thought of 
the legitimacy of mathematization is clearly at variance with Descartes’ identification 
of physics with geometry, but it nevertheless can be traced back to Descartes’ 
conception of magnitudes, as it was developed and analyzed from the notion of 
dimension in his Regulæ ad directionem ingenii (in particular, rule 14). This idea can 
be followed afterwards with further philosophical or mathematical specifications 
through authors such as Kant, Riemann and others.  
 This inquiry into the original thought of magnitudes, and of physical 
magnitudes conceived through mathematization, leads us to suggest an extension of 
meaning for the concept of physical magnitude that puts emphasis on its relational 
and structural aspects rather than restraining it to a simple «numerically valued» 
acception. Such a broadening would have immediate implications on our 
comprehension of «non classical» aspects of contemporary physics in the quantum 
area and in dynamical systems. 
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To the memory of Marx Wartofsky who used 
to consider «the philosophy of science in the 
broad context of [the] historical, analytic, and 
synthetic components of the philosophical 
enterprise»1. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
PHYSICAL THEORY, QUANTITIES  
AND PROBLEMS OF ONTOLOGY. 
 
 
 My aim in this reflection on the concept of quantity or magnitude is 
twofold : first, to inquire the legitimacy of mathematization of physics, and 
second, as a consequence of it, to consider the possibility in that science to extend 
the meaning of the concept of magnitude as it is commonly taken, i. e. quantities 
endowed with numerical values. Such an extension would be particularly 
appropriate to simplify problems met in the «interpretation» of quantum physics.  
 I would like to introduce my approach to this question with an 
evocation of something that stands in its background, namely the problem of 
realism, most often identified with that of ontology, provided that reality be 
implicitly assimilated to substance. It often seems to me that there is some 
misunderstanding on ontological questions when we speak about contemporary 
science, and in particular about physics. Already in XVIIIth century the notion of 
substance has been systematically criticized and rejected as a residue of scholastic 
thought. We shall come back later on to the claims of the physico-mathematicians 
                                            
1 Wartofsky [1968], p. v. 
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of that time (the Geometers, as they use to call themselves) as to which physics 
deals essentially with relations of physical quantities, expressed mathematically. 
There were no claim for any «absolute» ontology whatsoever : this lesson has 
largely been retained for nowadays science and philosophy of science, and I 
wonder whether XXth century's fights against ontology are aimed at an effective 
and real target.  
 «Ontology» being referred to «things», and these to «reality», the 
target is therefore actually reality, as it is clearly the case in the interpretation 
debate on quantum physics. But «physical reality», when its existence is asserted 
as constituting the proper object of physics, whatever be the idea one forms about 
it, is definitely no more thought as «substance»2, and can coexist with a 
«relativity of ontology», as we shall discuss soon.  
 
 
THEORY, SIGNIFICATION AND PROBLEMS OF ONTOLOGY 
 
 In his book Conceptual Foundations of Physical Thought, Marx 
Wartofsky, penetrantly and not so commonly, if we consider today empiricist 
claims in philosophy of science, insisted on the theoretical dimension of science, 
particularly in physics, that permits to overcome the limitations inherent to 
conceptions of mere deductive or covering-law model, with respect to semantic 
meaningfulness. It is so because theory is not closed in propositional language, 
observational observation or measurement statements refered to measurement, or 
theoretical terms reducible to empirical ones, in a pure phenomenalist way, but is 
aimed at objects, or things, to which we refer the properties under study3.  
 If we were not ready to accept this, we would have to change our 
notion of a physical universe to a universe made up of sensible data (in the line of 
George Berkeley, Stuart Mill, Ernst Mach and, I would say, Niels Bohr), and to 
change knowledge into a pure pragmatic enterprise. It happens that theory 
explains laws in an upper understanding level, above simple models and laws, and 
it has to be considered at its proper relevant level, where it «[carries as well] its 
interpretation with it», a trait that mere law is unable to exhibit4. Jean Largeault 
wrote in his own way, about physics, in a converging direction, that «the task of 
theories is (…) to determine what facts let undeterminate»5.  
 But then we get into problems, because the ontology that is (or was) 
usually associated with theories about things appears to be not so simple. First, 
                                            
2 On this, see, for instance, Cassirer [1910].  
3 Wartofsky [1968], p. 276-287.  
4 Ibid., p. 282. Marx Wartofsky, in this book, takes as equivalent the expressions «model, 
conceptual framework and theory», in the sense that «all observation and measurempent is 
theoretical or within the framework of some theoretical model» (ibid., p. 283). He considers as 
possible, compatible to this view, two conceptions, the realist and the constructivit ones, each of 
them raising serious philosophical questions, the second being merely instrumental and the first 
having to deal with the criteria of truth (p. 286-287).  
5 Largeault [1984], p. 155.  
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and generally speaking, we have to face the philosophical question on ontology 
raised from our systems of language and leading to what Willard V. Quine calls 
the «relativity of ontology» (circularity makes ontological questions meaningless 
and the choice of an ontology can only be pragmatic)6. «Relativity of ontology» 
appears also, and is akin to some degree of conventionalism, when we inquire, 
with respect to a scientific theory, into the foundations of our systems of concepts 
and the roots of our basic notions of reference taken as given data or as 
provisional evidences. Note that this is not so new, three centuries after Blaise 
Pascal's considerations, in his essay «De l'esprit géométrique» and in his 
«Pensée» on the disproportion of man in the universe, trying endlessly to get into 
the reasons of the reasons, in a regressive analysis of our basic notions7.   
 As for him, Marx Wartofsky used to speak of the «historicity of 
epistemologies and of ontologies» and sketched, in a seminar given in Paris in 
19948, the «three stages of the historical constitution of the scientific object ». He 
pointed, for the classical age of XVIIth century (a part of the second stage, after 
Greek culture), a conception of the «scientific object defined in space and time 
and totally accessible to measure», in which «the formalism is congruent with 
magnitudes»9. The realist epistemology, inspired from the astronomy and the 
physics of the time and their objects adequate to it, was not a philosophical 
choice, but was implicated by scientific practice. In opposition to this conception, 
comes that of the third stage, with the Einstein-Bohr debate on quantum 
mechanics, which exhibits two possible ontologies : the «realist» and the 
«constructivist» ones.  
 The constructivist (I would say the operational constructivist, Bohr) 
admits classical realism for daily life and chooses an ontological discontinuity for 
scientific knowledge, developing his complementarity conception. The realist (I 
would say the critical realist, Einstein), conceives a change for the construction of 
the classical as well as the scientific object with a continuity for the ontologic 
criteria. Marx Wartofsky considered contemporary physics as being in a 
constructivist stage, but this might change with time, for there was, according to 
him, a conceptual continuity in the debate between realism and constructivism, 
and one could not say that one of these epistemologies is wrong or right. He 
noticed, however, that the conventions are tested by experiment, which makes 
some difference with strict constructivism. As for him, he considered himself as 
                                            
6 Quine [1969]. Jean Largeault (who translated Quine's book into french), understood Quine's 
«relativity of ontology» as a «relativity of the points of view». He made pertinent observations on 
the «epistemic relativism» and the conventionalism of Poincaré and Quine as opposed to an 
«ontologic relativism» that ignores the difference between hypothetical convention and fact of 
nature (Largeault [1984], 151-156).  
7 Pascal [1657] and Pensées («Disproportion of man»), in Pascal [1993], p. 527.  
8 Seminar given (in french) to the REHSEIS research group of epistemology and history of science, 
of which he was a member during his sabbatical year 1993-1994, and where I had the pleasure to 
welcome him for the second time (the first one was in 1996-1997). He gave his lecture on may the 
10th, 1994 (the following quotations are from my personal notes). 
9 «The scientific object is object in space and the time, totally accessible to measure. The 
formalism is congruent with magnitudes». 
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sometimes a realist with constructivist tendency, and the reverse.  
 Nevertheless, is not critical realism a position of this kind ? With the 
reserve that we have to avoid ambiguities when using the word «constructivism». 
I mean by critical realism a position that includes symbolic constructions in the 
representations of reality, and that is conceived as a programme for the theoretical 
constructions of physics. 
 Having thus settled the general philosophical and metaphysical 
background of the scenery, let us come back to the problem of «ontology» 
considered from the point of view of a constructed or elaborated  science. 
 What we know in mathematics, and in physics as well, said Henri 
Poincaré, are relations («des rapports»)10. This is due to the fact that physics 
deals with concepts (symbolic and mental entities) that are expressed by 
magnitudes in the form of quantities. And, as if to complete Poincaré's statement, 
Einstein said that realism in science is a program, in the following sense : we 
admit that physical theory is aimed at describing or representing objects that are 
supposed to exist independently of our possibilities of observation and 
measurement (otherwise necessary to compare our representation with 
phenomena). This predicate of existence referred to an external world is only an 
assumption, indeed a very general one11. If this is ontology, it is meant in a broad 
acception of the word : it is, in a sense, an ontology of constructed relations 
aimed at something real, not of a real considered as such («in itself»)12. 
Furthermore, nothing compels us to it : we are free to choose it or not. But in both 
cases, we have to be consistent in our representation of things or phenomena.  
 It is the problem of this consistency that I want to explore for physics. 
Instead of asking questions of ontology, and of reducing to these the problems of 
signification or meaning of scientific statements, I would like to inquire directly 
the nature of these statements in the case of physics, in order to know whether 
they correspond to things and states of things in the above sense. That is, 
entangled in a consistent and, so to speak, organic way inside the theoretical 
scheme, without introducing, in their definition as things, restrictions that refer to 
conditions external to them (asking only, with respect to observation and 
experiment, an a posteriori agreement between theory and observation). 
 This leads us to two major problems that are specific of physics as a 
science. The first is about the reason of the privilege given to mathematization in 
the process of conceptualization and theory making in physics. And the second 
can be formulated as : what is meant, in this perspective, by «physical magnitudes 
expressed mathematically». 
 These two problems are, actually, one and the same, as we shall see 
from an inspection and a meditation on magnitudes in physics, their properties 
                                            
10 Poincaré [1905], chapters 10 and 11. 
11 Einstein [1949], p. 674-675 ; Paty [1993], p.474-478. 
12 Paty [1988], in particular chapters 1 and 10. On ontology, see also Largeault [1984], p. 142-
150, commenting René Thom's assertion that true knowledge is about being, not about the subject. 
(The referred article by R. Thom, «Le problème des ontologies régionales en science» (1982), can 
be found in Thom [1990]). 
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and meaning. 
 
 
2. 
 
PHYSICS : CONCEPTUALIZATION  
AND MATHEMATIZATION. 
 
 
MATHEMATIZATION AND STRUCTURATION OF PHYSICAL THEORIES 
 
 Tight relationship with mathematics (or with mathematization) and 
with quantitative observation and experiment makes the specificity of physics 
among the sciences. Already notable at the beginning of modern science, it 
ensured physics an enduring leadership on the other branches of knowledge, for 
physics was considered as a model for scientific rationality. In physics, 
phenomena are represented through concepts that are expressed in the form of 
magnitudes or quantities, endowed with exact definition in a mathematical way. 
The relations of physical concepts (for instance, distance and space coordinates, 
duration and time, force, etc.) are relations between these magnitudes, that take 
generally the form of equations or of quantitative propositions such as principles 
(of inertia, of relativity, or conservation principles, etc.). Equations are the 
mathematical expression of laws (laws of motion, laws of nature …) and the 
principles, formulated as general, ascertained properties of physical phenomena, 
provide the condition to express mathematically magnitudes and their relations. 
 This picture of what, esssentially, a physical theory is made of can be 
traced back to the beginning of mechanics, and is still adequate to describe the 
physics of present days. Let us now inquire further on what these quantities are, or 
better, on what is usually understood when we speak of, or deal with physical 
magnitudes or quantities. 
 
 
WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD BY «PHYSICAL MAGNITUDES» OR «QUANTITIES» ? 
 
 Our way to understand what is meant by physical quantity is tributary 
to the shifts entailed by the evolution of physics through our use of this concept. 
Since XIXth century, the importance taken by experimental means, activity, and 
practice, has enhanced the weight given to the possibility of measuring with 
exactness, this term of «exactness» being understood as synonymous of numerical 
precision. After all, experiments end with numbers, and so should be, according to 
the usual views, the meaning given to the concept of magnitude or quantity : they 
ought to be endowed with numerical values. Such a tendency has increased since 
XVIIIth century, when powerful methods of approximations were developed in 
astronomy (perturbations calculated through expansions in series in the three-
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body problem13), and above all in XIXth century when all daily phenomena of 
optics, electricity, magnetism, warmth, chemistry, were either assimilated by 
physical theories or submitted to systematic quantitative study14.  
 Let us add to this the construction of high precision scientific 
instruments and the general context of industrialization. And consider also that the 
requirement of numerical precision was reinforced and justified rationally and 
theoretically with the elaboration of a theory of errors, related with the 
mathematical theory of probability and to the so-called laplacean determinism 
(although the word «determinism» did not yet exist when Pierre-Simon Laplace 
gave an effective definition of it in the now classical statement of his Essay on the 
philosophy of probability15) : the «mot d'ordre» by then could be formulated as : 
exactness and probability, overcoming their effective duality (probability being 
understood in the «frequencial» or «subjective» meaning of deriving knowledge 
from an uncomplete set of data). 
 Quantity is understood as a «measure», continuous or discontinuous. 
The elaboration of physics, starting from mechanics with the scientific revolution 
of XVIIth century, has since gone along by dealing with quantities conceived 
according to «measure». «Order and measure», Descartes said, but «measure» 
had in his expression the old meaning of being subject to proportions, and not that 
of «measurement», as «measure» would be generally understood afterwards, 
corresponding with more or less direct experiment. This further acception would 
restrict the meaning with which physical quantities were to be most often 
considered, and this meaning was : quantities as taking definite numerical values, 
revealed by measurement. Most physical magnitudes - if not all, as many have 
thought it for a long time - are indeed of this type : space coordinates and 
distances, time and duration, velocity, acceleration, force, mass, energy, electric 
charge, electromagnetic or gravitational field as defined in space and time, etc. 
These concepts are represented by continuous quantities, with the help of 
diffential and integral calculus, and these quantities can be put in relation with 
some measurement device that determines their numerical values as a function of 
other quantities taken as varying parameters. 
 And so physics was standing, and the concept of physical magnitude, 
when quanta came. Physical magnitudes, endowed with numerical values, could 
only be, according to the usual conception, those that can be directly measured. 
But on this we shall come at the end. For now, we face the following situation : 
physical theories are mathematized, and this happens through their use of 
mathematically expressed quantities. But this is merely a description of what they 
are, not a justification. We have to go further in our inquiry about quantities and 
mathematization. 
 
 
                                            
13 See the astronomical works of Clairaut, Euler, d'Alembert, Laplace, etc. 
14 See, particularly, the works of Fresnel, Ampère, Faraday, Regnault, Joule, Fizeau, Mascart, etc. 
15 Laplace [1814], as an Introduction to his previously composed Analytical theory of probability 
(Laplace [1812]), p. vi-vii in Laplace's Complete work edition.  
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HISTORICAL ELABORATIONS : FROM QUALITIES TO QUANTITIES 
 
 Let us go directly to the essential. For this, we must not forget from 
where our concepts and their meaning come, because their structuration in the 
present is made from the flesh of the past. (Precisely, if there is no obvious 
ontology of the things we deal with, the rescue might be to know how their tissue 
has been woven).  
 The idea of magnitude, already in Antiquity and in Middle Age, 
contained a conceptual meaning (it was anciently, quality) in association, 
eventually, with numerical values (intensities or degrees of a quality). For 
Aristotle, for instance, time was the number of motion. But the concept of motion 
itself was a complex one, implying power and continuous cause, and the concept 
of velocity stayed with an ontologic, qualitative, meaning, that was related with 
difference of nature between motion and rest16.  
 A slow shift occurred during Middle Age, as it is known, from 
qualities to quantities, in XIVth centuty, with the scholastic masters of the 
Universities of Oxford and Paris (Robert Gosseteste, William of Ockham, Jean 
Buridan, Nicole Oresme…), through the study of the variation of intensity of the 
«quality of motion», or velocity, with time, and the invention of the concept of 
«impetus», a dynamical impulsion conceived as an internal action transferred to 
the body in motion. These were important steps towards geometrization and 
mathematization of motion17.  
 History, here, teaches another thing : the necessity to get first the right 
physical principles in order to be able to perform mathematization. Such is one of 
Galileo Galilei's lessons : with his totally new conception of «impeto», that was 
no more the cause, but the effect of motion, he did put on the forefront two 
essential ideas : the conservation of motion and the law of inertia18. Galileo's 
quantification of motion corresponded to an effective vanishing of quality, motion 
being set on the same ontological status as rest. Motion or velocity did not affect 
the properties of bodies. Motions of various kinds could therefore be unified, 
velocities (or, actually, quantities of motion, or impulsions) could be composed 
and the change of motion in the free fall of bodies could be studied 
«quantitatively», that is to say through magnitudes or quantities. The last step of 
physical theory construction was the choice of the good quantity (or concept) to 
study the laws of motion. Time was this concept and entered in physics as a 
fundamental variable19. 
 The shift from qualities to quantities was decisive in the making of 
physical theory, by which laws were formulated as equations between the 
quantities carrying the conceptual contents. 
                                            
16 Aristotle [Phys]. Cf. Clagett [1959]. On the evolution of the concepts of time, space, velocity, 
relativity, vacuum, see respectively Paty [1994b, 1998c, 1997c, 1999c, 1998b]. More generally, on 
the changes in the relations between philosophy and physics, cf. Paty [1998a].  
17 See, in particular, Duhem [1913-1959], Crombie [1952], Clagett [1959]. 
18 Koyré [1935-1939]. See also Clavelin [1968], Drake [1970].  
19 Paty [1994b]. 
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 Of the subsequent history of the construction of physics through 
mathematization, we shall only mention another decisive step, the construction of 
«instantaneous time» from the notion of time conceived as duration (continuous 
flow and quantity), suited to formulate the «law of causality» of newtonian 
dynamics. This invention (to let all details aside) was correlated with the new 
calculus (of fluxions for Newton, differential and integral for Leibniz) although 
Newton meant to stay with «synthetic geometry» in his elaboration of dynamics. 
But his geometry of limits defined and used in the Principia is equivalent to his 
calculus of fluxions20. What interests us, at this stage, is the rise of a new kind of 
magnitude, that would be explicited later on : continuous quantities 
conceptualized through differential and integral calculus, i.e. analysis, the «new 
analysis». 
 The impulse was thereof given. Physics would be build afterwards, in 
all its branches, through analytization, with the differential conception of space, 
time and other required quantities. 
 
 
THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF MATHEMATIZATION IN PHYSICS. 
 
 To justify the mathematical character of magnitudes and laws in 
physics, Galileo invoked the idea that the «Book of Nature» is written in the 
language of figures and numbers. «Its type letters», he wrote, speaking of the 
Universe, «are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without which it 
would be impossible to a human being to understand a single world of it». And he 
added that all properties of external bodies in nature can be attributed, in ultimate 
analysis, to the notions of «magnitudes, figures, numbers, and slow or fast, and 
those have effects on our sensorial perceptions, and are, so to speak, the true 
essence of the things»21. 
 As to Isaac Newton, he expressed, in his Principia, the laws of 
mechanics and of gravitation in a geometrical way, giving effect to the intention 
claimed right from the title of his book, The mathematical principles of natural 
philosophy22. These «mathematical principles» were, actually, more related to a 
general conception of geometry («synthetic geometry» called for in the Preface23) 
rather than to the analytical one, although his «geometry of limits» (of the «first 
and last reasons of quantities»24), through which he formulated the problems of 
mechanics and astronomy and got his results, was conceptually equivalent to the 
fluxion calculus he had elaborated in mathematics. This difference might be 
related to his conception of the mathematization of mechanics and of the laws of 
physics.  
                                            
20 Paty [1994a].  
21 Galileo, in Il Saggiatore (Galileo [1623]). 
22 Newton [1687]. See Whiteside [1970]. 
23 Newton [1687], Newtons's Preface to the first edition.  
24 Newton [1687], Book 1, Section 1, Cajori ed., p. 29-39.  
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 Newton's use of mathematics in mechanics was justified by him from 
his neo-platonician conception of the physical world that was going along with his 
«absolute, true and mathematical concepts» such as space, time, motion, force, 
etc.25  
 But physics afterwards, although it was based on newtonian dynamics, 
meant differently the legitimacy of being mathematized, and this divergence can 
be seen already in the works of XVIIIth century «Geometers» such as Leonhard 
Euler, Alexis Clairaut and Jean le Rond d'Alembert (and later on, Joseph-Louis 
Lagrange, Pierre-Simon Laplace and others). Despite their inheritance of 
Newton's achievements, they understood the meaning and use of mathematical 
quantities for physics differently from him, in a way that was more neutral to 
metaphysics.  
 Take, for instance, d'Alembert's justification of «analysis» in his 
works on dynamics or on hydrodynamics (or astronomy as well) : analysis was 
inherent to his thinking of mechanical concepts. He thought dynamics from the 
start through the basic concepts of motion and the corresponding magnitudes 
(space, time, velocity, impulsion, acceleration, …) as conceived and expressed 
with the use of differential calculus, giving a formulation of the three principles of 
dynamics (inertia, composition of motions, equilibrium) in such terms. He was 
able in this way, from his expression of the second principle of motion, to add 
directly to a given velocity the differential of another one, getting Newton's 
«second law» (of accelerated force) as a corollary. He gave an original 
formulation also of the third «principle» of motion (that of «equilibrium», 
equivalent to Newton's third law, of «action and reaction», but in terms of 
destroyed or compensated motions), and obtained as a neat result his famous 
general («d'Alembert's») «principle», actually a powerful «theorem» of dynamics, 
directly demonstrated26. Lagrange's systematic algebraic construction of 
«Analytical mechanics» would rest on the same type of direct justification, due to 
the conceptual mathematical definitions of physical magnitudes. On the same 
«conceptual mathematical» basis were mathematical physics, and henceafter 
theoretical physics, elaborated27. 
 About the mathematization of hydrodynamics (whose theoretization 
he was the first to perform through the invention and use of the partial differential 
equations calculus28), d'Alembert stated very clearly the conditions that were 
required in the introduction to his Essay of a new theory of the resistence of 
fluids : «The sciences called physico-mathematical (…) consist of the application 
of calculus to the phenomena of nature. (…) The invention of differential and 
integral calculus has allowed us to follow in some way the motion of bodies up to 
their elements or ultimate particles». Then, d'Alembert wrote (I would like to put 
emphasis on it) : «It is only with the help of these calculations that we can 
                                            
25 Newton [1687], Scholium to the Definitions, Cajori ed., p. 6.  
26 D'Alembert [1743]. See Paty [in press, a]. 
27 Paty [1994a].   
28 D'Alembert [1747, 1749-1752]. See Grimberg [1998].    
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penetrate inside Fluids, and discover the play of their parts, the actions that 
mutually exert, the ones on the others, these inumerous atoms of which a Fluid is 
composed, and that appear at the same time united and divided, dependent and 
independent the ones from the others». It is so because «the inner mechanism of 
Fluids is so poorly analogous to that of solid bodies which we touch, and follows 
laws that are so much different  (…)»29.  
 Interestingly enough, d’Alembert stated in the above quotation the 
necessity of theory, of a physical and mathematized theory, as the only way to get 
knowledge of such bodies, definitely substituting imagination and arbitrary 
hypothese. 
 In the same writing, d’Alembert explained how it is only when a 
physical principle about the object (or type of phenomena) under consideration 
has been obtained that mathematization is possible : «I thought what I needed was 
to look for these principles and the manner in which I had to apply the calculus, if 
possible». Mathematization is governed by the type of physical properties that are 
considered : such a requirement is post-newtonian and, in a way, un-cartesian. 
 It is nevertheless fundamentally to René Descartes that d’Alembert 
gave the credit of having made possible, as a matter of principle, the 
mathematization of physics. Descartes’s invention of algebraic geometry, which 
d’Alembert used to call «application of algebra to geometry» and which he 
qualified as «an idea among the widest and the happiest that human spirit has ever 
had»30, will, as the geometer-encyclopedist wrote in his Preliminary  Discourse to 
the Encyclopédie, «always be the key of the deepest researches, not only in the 
Sublime Geometry (Géométrie Sublime) [i.e. Analysis in the sense of differential 
and integral calculus], but in all physico-mathematical sciences»31. This remark 
points at the most fundamental reason of the mathematization of physics, with the 
mathematical treatment of physical concepts expressed with the form of 
continuous quantities. 
 The new conception of the mathematization of physics that has been 
shared by most scientists since XVIIIth century up to the present times, and that 
has been formulated in the clearest way by d'Alembert, is somewhat at variance 
with Descartes’ identification of physics with geometry32, for it was admitted, 
with Newton, that bodies, even when considered only under their «essential 
properties», are not reducible to mere spacial «extension». Besides extension, 
bodies have properties such as impenetrability and attraction that are not reducible 
to it, and mechanics (and, more generally, physics) differ from geometry and 
mathematics in that it deals with variations in time : mechanics, said again 
                                            
29 D'Alembert [1749-1752], Introduction to the book published in 1752, p. vii-xliii (my emphasis, 
M.P.). 
30 D'Alembert, article «Application …» of the Encyclopédie (Diderot & d'Alembert [1751-1780], 
vol. 1, published in 1751), and Eclaircissements à l'Essai sur les Eléments de philosophie, in the 
1987 ed of d'Alembert [1758], chapter 13. 
31 D'Alembert [1751], éd. 1965, p. 94.  
32 Descartes [1637, 1644]. 
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d'Alembert (and Lagrange after him), expresses as geometry varied with time33. 
The new views on mathematization can notwithstanding be traced back to 
Descartes’ conception of magnitudes, as he developed and analyzed them from 
the notion of dimension in his Rules for the direction of mind (Regulæ ad 
directionem ingenii) written around 1628 (in particular, rule 14)34.  
 
 
3.  
 
INTELLIGIBILITY REFERRED TO ORDER AND MEASURE. ON 
MAGNITUDES OR QUANTITIES 
 
 
DESCARTES' «MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS».  
THE TWO FUNCTIONS OF MATHEMATICS IN THE USE OF REASON 
 
 Beyond the extension he had given to mathematics in their unifying 
methods and in their operations, Descartes conceived «his mathesis universalis» 
as having an even more general dimension, that revealed the faculties of 
intelligence itself, able to be manifested in other areas of knowledge and even in 
metaphysics. In particular, it was suited to the knowledge of the real physical 
world, by making use of mathematics in various domains of physics. Descartes ‘s 
Rules for the direction of the mind and, afterwards, the Discourse on Method, 
claim a twofold function of mathematics in the exercise of reason35. Firstly, they 
serve as a model and as a guarantee for certainty in the linking of propositions. 
Rule 1 states that the power of mathesis universalis can be oriented towards the 
formation or the acquisition, by the mind, of the ability to form «firm and true 
judgements on everything that is presented to him»36. Secondly, they rule the 
expression of magnitudes by which we represent the world. As to this second 
function, considering the natural sciences concerned by mathematics such as 
astronomy, music, optics, mechanics, and eventually others, Descartes saw 
clearly, he said, that we have to «bring to mathematics everything in which we 
examine order and measure» («l’ordre et la mesure»), without specifying the 
particular object of this measure37.  
 Through his considerations, Descartes did not so much intend to 
elaborate a physics, or a mechanics, from mathematics, which he, actually, never 
fully tried or achieved, than to think the intelligibility of the objects of these 
sciences. He would, indeed, perform some mathematical approach of mechanics 
                                            
33 D'Alembert [1743] Première partie, [1759], chapitre 16, p. 367-402, and article «Dimension» of 
the Encyclopédie in Diderot & d'Alembert [1751-1780], vol. 4 (1754). See Paty [1977, 1998c].  
34 Descartes [1628]. See Paty [1997, 1998a].   
35 Descartes [1628, 1637]. 
36 Descartes [1628]. 
37 Descartes [1628]. See the comment to Rule 4.   
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and of optics, insofar as they are related to quantities ; and he would further 
propose to geometrize physics as a consequence of his identification of matter and 
spatial extension38. But the fondamental claim with respect to physics that is to be 
found in his Rules, and also in his further works up to the Principles of 
Philosophy, was about the need and necessity of laws39. 
 
 
ORDER AND MEASURE. QUANTITIES, PLURALITIES, RELATIONS 
 
 Actually, to Descartes, physics was a science of magnitudes 
(«grandeurs») that are subject to proportions, and its mathematization in principle 
through laws was immediately justified, under the sign of the exigency for 
intelligilility, related to mathesis universalis. In this sense, it was primarily the 
very road to knowledge that led to the mathematization of magnitudes concerning 
the real world, at variance with the neo-platonician reasons invoked by Newton 
(the «true and mathematical»world as opposed to the «apparent and common» or 
«sensible» one). 
 In Rule 14, Descartes defined magnitude in general, relative to any 
object, by making use of the concept of dimension considered as spacial extension 
of geometry, taken as the archetype of any magnitude at reach of order and 
measure. «The dimension is the real extension of the body, when we make 
abstraction of anything except the figure…», he stated. The relation between 
magnitudes (allowing to know one from another) is at the same time the 
expression of their  ontological identity. 
 Descartes performed in his text a conceptual analysis of the aspects of 
extension that are related to differences of proportions, and identified them as 
dimension, unit, and figure. Dimension is «the mode and manner by which we 
consider a subject as measurable», and this concerns not only the three spatial 
dimensions, but other magnitudes as weight, velocity, etc. Measure is refered to 
division in equal parts (it can be only an intellectual division), and is the reverse 
of counting : «If we consider the parts in relation with the whole, we say that we 
count ; if, on the contrary, we consider the whole as divised into parts, we 
measure it»40. And it is the task of the physicist (and not of the mathematician) to 
examine the well-foundedness in reality of «dimension» understood in this sense, 
that is, magnitude. 
 As for unit, it is the common nature of the things that are compared. 
And figures are of two types : pluralities and magnitudes. Pluralities are, for 
example, points or any element ordered in space, whereas magnitudes (or 
quantities) are continuous and indivisible (like the area of a triangle, or a square). 
All the relations than can exist between figures of the same kind «must be referred 
to two essentiel points, that are order and measure». 
                                            
38 Descartes [1637, 1644]. See Paty [1997]. 
39 See Koyré [1965].    
40 Descartes [1628], Rule 14. 
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 Descartes made at that point a consideration about possible 
simplifications of problems involving continuous magnitudes : these «can, thanks 
to a borrowed unit, be sometimes brought completely to a plurality, and always at 
least in part. The plurality of units can afterwards be disposed in an order such 
that the difficulty, relative to the knowledge of measure, depends finally of the 
order only»41. 
 
 
CONSONANCES AND PREFIGURATIONS 
 
 It is tempting to see in these reflections a consonance with the 
analysis, that was to be performed two centuries after by Bernhard Riemann, of 
the mathematical concept of multiplicity or manyfold, of which the three spatial 
dimensions are a particular case, and even some prefiguration of the idea of 
topology («analysis situs», indicated by Leibniz and Euler, and first developed by 
Riemann). We might think of a correspondence between the following couples : 
order / measure, plurality / magnitude and, in further terms, topology / metrics. 
 One might also see, in the last quoted Descartes' sentence, an insight 
into a difficulty of principle to be met in the analysis of continuous quantities that 
would be explicit when they would be treated by differential equations, such as 
the impossibility to solve these equations, despite their full adequation to describe 
a physical situation : one would then have to leave up the exact (metrical) 
calculations and consider «qualitative», «structural», or topological features, as 
Henri Poincaré would do far later. 
 Let us conclude this evocation of Descartes’s founding conception of 
magnitudes by stating that the quantitative aspect of magnitudes, that make them 
«measurable», must not be understood in the restricted sense of numerical 
determinations only, to which it has often been reduced. What was important, for 
Descartes, was the relation into which the magnitude is expressed, that is its form 
(for example in an algebraic relation). «Measure» meant, to Descartes, the 
relational aspect of magnitudes or quantities. 
 We can, today take profit of this lesson : the conceptual content of a 
magnitude, even a mathematized one, does not vanish when it is attributed a value 
with a number, and remains given in the relation that determines it. Physical 
magnitudes conceived through a mathematical form, and aimed at describing or 
representing objects and phenomena of the physical world, will have exactly the 
relations as their mathematical forms have42. Therefore, the system of physical 
concepts is thread by the mathematization of the magnitudes expressing these 
concepts. 
 This justification of the use of mathematics in physics is self-
consistent and does not refer to any other philosophical claim than intelligibility 
                                            
41 Descartes [1628], Rule 14 (my emphasis, M.P.). 
42 See, for instance, the analysis of the physical meaning of Lorentz' transformation formulas as 
demonstrated in Einstein's 1905 work on special relativity, with its consequences on the new 
concepts of space and time : Paty [1993], chapter 4. 
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through «order and measure». It was to be considered later on, but uncessarily in 
my view, as being related to Descartes' further essential identification of matter 
with spacial extension, and of physics with geometry, as exposed in his Principles 
of philosophy43. Repudiating this identification, Newton believed he could found 
mathematization of physics (that was still to be a geometrization) on his neo-
platonistic view of the world, refering to «absolute, true and mathematical» 
quantities of the real world as opposed to «relative, apparent and common» ones, 
the latter being «not the quantities themselves, whose name they bear, but those 
sensible measures of them (either accurate or inaccurate), which are commonly 
used instead of the measured quantities themselves»44,. 
 However, the «continental tradition» of newtonian mechanics that was 
to determine the ways of mathematical and theoretical physics of XVIIIth and 
XIXth centuries (that is, of classical physics) would justify mathematization much 
more in the line of a cartesian conception of intelligibility and magnitudes 
(actually modified to take into account the effects, on the acquisition of knowlege, 
of sensorial data initially in a lockean way) than in Newton's one45. Indeed this 
«tradition», that started after Christiaan Huygens and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
with the cartesian disciples of the latter and the malebranchists (cartesian) circles 
(Jacob and Johann Bernoullis, Michel de l'Hospital, Pierre Varignon, etc.)46, 
adopted and developed the leibnizian differential and integral calculus and 
formulated in its terms (those of the «new analysis») the problems opened in the 
lines of Newton's Principa. This «graft» (or synthesis ?) of newtonian physics by 
leibnizian formalism thus occurred in a cartesian philosophical ground, and would 
blossom with the outstanding works of Euler, Clairaut and d'Alembert, then of 
Lagrange, Laplace and others47. That is why the cartesian conception of 
intelligibility and correlative justification of the mathematization of physical 
magnitudes has henceforth, at least implicitly, underlined the developements of 
theoretical physics up to our times48.  
 The central idea of this justification, rather neutral with respect to 
metaphysics, can be followed with further philosophical or mathematical 
specifications through authors such as d'Alembert, Kant, Ampère, Riemann, 
Poincaré, Hermann Weyl, Einstein….  
 
 
THE KANTIAN METAPHYSICS OF MAGNITUDES 
 
                                            
43 Descartes [1644].  
44 Newton [1687], Scholium of Definitions, Cajori's ed., p. 6, 11. 
45 Paty [1977, 1994a, in press, a].  
46 See, for instance, the edition of Johann Bernoulli's works, Bernoulli [1989-1991] ; and for a 
more general outlook, Blay [1992]. On Leibniz' calculus, cf. Leibniz [1849-1863, 1989]. 
47 See, in particular, on Clairaut : Greenberg [1995], Passeron [1994] ; on d'Alembert : Paty 
[1977], Emery & Monzani [1989], Grimberg [1998] ; on Lagrange : Martin-Viot [1994] ; on 
Laplace : Merleau-Ponty [1986].  
48 On the contemporaneous conceptions, see Paty [1986, 1988, 1993].  
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 The most significant attempt, from a properly philosophical point of 
view, after that of Descartes, to base the intelligibility of the tangible world of 
physics on understanding, remains that of Immanuel Kant in his Critique of the 
pure reason. After the «Transcendental æsthetics» («science of all the principles 
of a priori sensitivity»), conditioning knowledge as formed by the understanding 
and the apprehension of phenomena49), comes the «Transcendental analytic», that 
is the «decomposition of all our a priori knowledge in elements of the pure 
knowledge of the understanding»50. The synthetic principles of pure 
understanding include those deal essentially with the idea of magnitude and with 
the possibility to apply mathematics to phenomena. To these principles are added 
those of the «Analogies of experiment» and of the «Postulates of the empirical 
thought in general». The principle of the «Axioms of intuition» defines 
magnitudes, extensive as well as intensive, by stating that «all intuitions are 
intensive magnitudes». That of the «Anticipation of perception» based on the idea 
that «in all phenomena, the real, that is an object of the sensation, has a magnitude 
that is a degree», allows to constitute in the transcendental subject the condition of 
the apprehension of continuous magnitudes, extensive as well as intensive. The 
variation in the degrees of continuous magnitudes was directly inspired by the 
thought of the derivated and differential magnitudes of analysis and of newtonian 
physics51. 
 Extensive magnitudes are such that the representation of the parts 
makes possible that of the whole, and they are formed therefore on the 
representation of spatial distances. Intensive magnitudes are relative to the degree 
of the caused sensation. To conceive them, Kant imagined a gradual change of 
empirical consciousness into pure consciousness by a progressive and continuous 
diminution of sensation, in such a way that the real would disappear completely 
and «it would remain only a purely formal (a priori) consciousness of the various 
in space and time». 
 It was consequently possible to apply mathematics to natural 
phenomena.  Actually, both kantian principles, of the axioms of intuition and of 
the anticipations of perception, in his words, «are related to phenomena according 
to their simple possibility, and teach us how these phenomena can be produced, 
following the rules of a mathematical synthesis, according as well to their 
intuition as to the real of their perception. One can therefore use, in one as in the 
other, numerical magnitudes and, with them, the determination of the 
phenomenon as a magnitude»52. 
 
 
THE RIEMANIAN ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLICITIES 
 
                                            
49 Kant [1781-1787], fr. transl., p. 781-811.  
50 Kant [1781-1787], fr. transl., p.  
51 Ibid., p. 902-914. 
52 Ibid., p. 916.  
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 It is appropriate, this time from a more precisely conceptual point of 
view, to make a special mention of Riemann's 1854 Dissertation «On the 
hypothese that serve as foundations to Geometry»53. Riemann studied 
systematically in it the properties that can be formulated mathematically for a 
continuous variety - or magnitude -, of any kind, with a number n of dimensions, 
and their eventual relationship with physical magnitudes. These properties are 
either topological either metrical, and Riemann proposed to establish a direct 
connection between the metrical relationships of the three dimensional space and 
the properties of physical bodies. By doing this, as one knows, he prepared, 
although being unaware of it, the mathematical framework of a geometrized 
physical theory - of gravitation - that the general theory of relativity was to be. 
 In his study, Riemann faced first the problem to construct, with the 
general concept of magnitude as a starting point, the concept of a magnitude with 
multiple dimensions. Such magnitudes are conceived according to quantity, and 
the comparison of their parts is undertaken «for discrete magnitudes, by means of 
counting, for continuous magnitudes, by means of measuring. (…)»54. This 
expression reminds us of Descartes' statement quoted earlier on «measuring and 
counting»55.  
 Among the diversity of possible cases, Riemann considered in 
particular that of an absence of measure, whose researches, he commented, «form 
a general branch of the theory of magnitudes, independent of metrical 
determinations, and in which they [magnitudes] are not considered as existing 
independently of the position, neither as expressible by means of a unit, but as 
regions in a variety». 
 By characterizing the difference between topology and metrics, 
Riemann derived from it a consequence, for space, that would be of a 
fundamental importance : one must distinguish, for «uncommensurably large» 
spaces, between the «unlimited» (what has no limits), that belongs to extension 
(topological) relationships, and the «infinity», that belongs to metrical 
relationships. The first property is general and qualitative, so to speak, while the 
second one depends on the metrics. (And we know that a metrics postulated as 
euclidian had led to identify them). 
 With respect to extended magnitudes, Riemann established a 
distinction between their properties within a general (purely mathematical) theory 
as the one he considered, and their physical determinations. With the first, «one 
supposes nothing more than what is already contained in the concept of such 
magnitudes», while the second corresponds to properties of the physical universe, 
that are not given by the first one. In other words, the metrics of space is not given 
a priori and will be provided by physics, and Euclide's postulate has, actually, an 
empirical origin ; it is relative to extension in conformity with men' experience, to 
the «empirical concepts on which the metrical determinations of extension are 
                                            
53 Riemann [1854]. Cf Paty [1993], chapter 7.  
54 Riemann [1854].   
55 Descartes [1928], Rule 14. See above.  
MICHEL PATY  THE IDEA OF QUANTITY AT THE ORIGIN OF THE LEGITIMACY OF MATHEMATIZATION IN PHYSICS 18 
based», namely, «the concept of solid body and that of light ray»56. Now, these 
latter «cease to subsist in the infinitely small». «It is therefore quite legitimate», 
Riemann goes on, «to suppose that metrical relationships of space in the infinitely 
small are no more adequate to the hypotheses of geometry, and this is what it 
would effectively be necessary to admit, once one would obtain from there a 
simpler explanation of phenomena. The question of the validity of the hypotheses 
of geometry in the infinitely small is linked to the question of the intimate 
principle of metrical relationships in space57. 
 The conceptual clarifications possibilited by Riemann's general theory 
of  magnitudes would be effective, and respond to his wish of preventing thought 
to remain hindered «by too narrow views» and «progress in the knowledge of the 
mutual dependence of things to find an obstacle in traditional prejudices». These 
effects would be felt in mathematics as well as in physics. Besides the possibility 
of non euclidian geometries and the physical character of space metrics, such a 
reflection opened another perspective for mathematical as well as for physical 
study of space, alternative to the metrical approach : the approach of topology, 
that could be, in some conditions, more «explanatory» than the first one. As an 
effect, it opened also at the same time the way of qualitative study for the 
solutions of differential equations systems and of the corresponding physical 
phenomena, where the «structural» characteristics of the relationships, and the 
associated types of physical behavior, appear more significant than «exact» (in the 
sense of quantitative, numerical) determinations of the particular magnitudes. It 
would appear to be so with Poincaré's pioneer works on the three body problem 
and on the properties of dynamical systems, whose further inheritance consitutes 
today an important part of physics.  
 Let us mention, on the other hand, that contemporary researches on 
problems such as that of quantum gravitation let increasingly conceivable that 
topological properties of magnitudes of any dimensions appear also as a 
conceptual tool that could be indispensable for the physics to come (quantum 
gravitation, etc.). 
 
 
4 
 
TYPES OF MAGNITUDES FOR PHYSICS  
AND THE «QUALITATIVE» OF THE QUANTITATIVE  
(ORDER IN RELATION) 
 
 
PHYSICAL MAGNITUDES, CONCEPTUAL ABSTRACTIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
MATHEMATICS 
 
                                            
56 Riemann [1854].  
57 Riemann [1854].   
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 The mathematization of physical magnitudes took mainly the form of 
differential and integral calculus that, in its origin, had allowed to surpass the 
antinomy between continuous magnitudes taken at a point and a singular instant. 
Partial derivative equations, mathematically developed in conjunction with their 
utilization in the elaboration of fluids mechanics (by the pioneer works of 
d'Alembert58, followed by those of Euler), became the «language» of the physics 
of continuous media and of fields (first thought with the support of a material 
medium such as ether, caloric, etc.). These mathematical forms became the 
indispensable way of physical thought that could henceforth spread its domain 
and its objects.  
 To classical magnitudes such as those of spacial coordinates, time, 
speed, mass, force, moment of inertia, work, energy, etc., others were added, as 
potential, electrical charge, field defined in space and time with finite velocity 
propagation (replacing newtonian instantaneous «action at a distance», but that it 
was difficult to think independently from an ether) and, later on, others, more 
«abstract», that we shall not evoke at length (see, for instance, «quantum 
numbers», «spin», etc. ). These magnitudes require, from their very definition, 
various mathematical forms, besides numbers, functions and the differential forms 
already mentionned. Depending on the needs or conveniences of their 
relationships between them, these magnitudes can take the mathematical form of 
complex numbers, vectors, tensors, matrices, spinors, functions with integrable 
squared defined in Hilbert spaces and linear operators acting on these functions - 
socket of quantum mechanics -, distributions, etc.  
 The thought of magnitudes has enriched with all the development of 
mathematics, and physics has been fed with it, integrating to the expression of its 
concepts the new mathematical objects and theories and the associated calculation 
methods, whose invention it sometimes contributed to raise. It deals, in the 
expression of its laws, with magnitudes of various types, increasingly abstract as 
to their form and far away from that, intuitive and generative, of simple spacial 
dimension.  
 The concept of entropy, introduced by Rudolf Clausius, was one of 
such abstract entities that appear at first sight more mathematical than physical in 
an intuitive sense. Rather than a quantity directly interpreted on a measurement 
scale, its proper characteristics are to be relative with time (it means time's 
variation for a given system) and to express an order more than a measure in the 
sense of a distance or a graduation. Not without argument, Pierre Duhem saw in 
the second principle of thermodynamics (the increase of entropy for closed 
systems) a breaking down with mechanical conceptions, as it can only be 
formulated in such an abstract and non intuitive, and even quasi axiomatical, 
manner59. New quantities of this kind can actually be given, after their 
introduction, a more «intuitive» content in the usual sense of «intuitive», not so 
much of a possible mechanical model but of a direct theoretical function in the 
                                            
58 D'Alembert [1749-1752].  
59 See Duhem [1906] and his various works on thermodynamics and energetics. 
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thought of phenomena (consider also, for instance, previous to entropy, the 
concept of potential in electrodynamics60).  
 Such magnitudes within some time have been transcribed in terms of 
observable quanties, as for entropy those of statistical mechanics with 
Boltzmann's formula (or principle)61. Not all magnitudes dealt with in theoretical 
physics are in the situation of being reducible to directly mesurable ones : more 
challenging are quantities met in some recent chapters of physics and that are not 
simply endowed with numerical values. Are they only mathematical quantities 
used in physical theory, but not truly physical ones ? We shall come to these when 
concluding. But, as we speak of physics, the following statement is shared in 
common by all those cases : the legitimacy and the physical meaning of these 
magnitudes, abstract by their form but that become «concrete» and «intuitive» for 
our representation, are derived on the one hand from the demands of the 
understanding and, on the other hand, from repeated confrontation to experiment, 
through reproductibility of phenomena and predictivity. 
 
 
MAGNITUDES OR QUANTITIES ? REDISCOVERING RELATION AND «QUALITY» OR 
ORDER UNDER THE RELATION 
 
 Problems are met with in physics (even in classical physics) such that 
although magnitudes can be defined by referring to physical situations, and can be 
put in relations by exact deterministic laws, they do not provide a precise 
description of the considered system or phenomenon. Such situations reflect 
actually similar mathematical properties for equations. It is not unusual that one 
does not know how to integrate differential equations that nevertheless represent 
exactly the motion of a physical system, or that one can do it only by 
approximations (for example, already in the three interacting bodies problem). Or 
again, it may happen that physical processes are represented with the help of 
divergent series (as d'Alembert noticed it already in XVIIIth century, for 
mechanical processes).  
 One may wonder, about situations of this type, what does that mean as 
to the mathematical (or, rather, mathematized) representation of these motions or 
processes, although the latter is wholly justified by the relationships between the 
magnitudes in play. The ones will maintain that it is still the exact form of the 
equation that represents the phenomenon, even if we do not know how to solve it 
exactly. The others, on the contrary, more preoccupied with approximate results 
and with numerical values corresponding to the possibilities of measurements, 
will let aside the idea of a theoretical  representation, considered as inoperative, 
and will favour mere models with practical solutions.  
 We meet here, it seems to me, a limitation of the «quantitative» in the 
usual meaning, that is to say that of numerical determination, and some kind of 
                                            
60 And Paul Langevin's comments about it (Langevin [1933]).   
61 S  kLogW , where S  is the entropy, W  the probability, k the Boltzmann's constant. 
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«qualitative» is needed. In other words, the «qualitative» comes to the help of the 
«quantitative». But this «qualitative» is to be understood as assuming the 
quantitative, and is not going back to ontology or substance. It is actually nothing 
else than the idea of relationship, extended in that of structure, given in the form 
of the mathematized magnitudes themselves. Remember that this idea was at the 
heart of Descartes' conception. 
 The elaboration of physics, starting with mechanics, has gone along 
by dealing with magnitudes or quantities conceived according to «measure» but, 
as we stated at the beginning, the word «measure» underwent insensibly in the 
meantime a shift of its meaning, being more commonly understood as 
«measurement» than as mathematical relation (as it was in Descartes' sense). The 
increasing importance of experiment together with the concern for precision of 
experimental data that had become efficient with the theory of errors, not to forget 
a general positivist attitude crystallized in XIXth century science, led the concept 
of measure to refer more to observation than to intelligibility. Measured or 
measurable quantities have meant from that time uniquely, and perhaps 
restrictively, quantities taking numerical values, as it was most usually the case in 
classical physics.  
 But one could ask whether physical magnitudes of another kind than 
those being purely «with numerical value» could not be defined as well, assuming 
a larger meaning for «measure» and a wider spectrum of possibilities for the 
(mathematical) forms of relations a physical magnitude could be made of. One 
could also think of other modes of «relation» than «measure» understood in the 
sense of «metrics», reminding what Descartes referred to «order» and Riemann to 
«topology». Such questions are far from being illegitimate, and might be fruitful, 
considering some pecular aspects of contemporary physics, either in the theory of 
dynamical systems or in quantum physics, and possibly in other areas as well. 
Could we not imagine such «magnitudes of another kind» as having, for example, 
a definite mathematical expression but not being themselves directly put in 
correspondence with numerical values, this being let to their elements only ?  
 It might well be that such «unusual» mathematical representations of 
magnitudes would more and more fit cases met with in present physics, and 
indeed simplify our understanding of them. Take, for instance, a «physical» 
magnitude, whatever it might be, let us say the state of a «system», that would 
have the mathematical form of a linear superposition of elementary or referential 
magnitudes in the previous «numerically valued» sense ; or, indeed, another one, 
conceived to determine the first, that would be a matrix operator, whose elements 
only would be numerically valued. Or again a type of magnitude that would 
express not trajectories in space and time of the parts of a dynamical system but 
some characteristics of its equilibrium states and behaviour patterns.  
 And also, considering some kinds of physical systems having 
properties that cannot be reduced to properties in the sense of directly measurable 
quantities, univoquely defined or determined (for example, a position in space), 
would this trait be more problematic than, say, to consider a topological property 
independently of a metrical one ?  
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 Such entities of the kind just evoked have generally been considered 
as non physical ones. When physicists have nevertheless to deal with such 
«formal expressions», they afford them a physical meaning only indirectly : they 
elaborate rules of transcription and interpretation that relate such «complex» 
quantities to quantities directly endowed with numerical values. Such is, for 
example, in quantum physics, the «reduction» rule for the «measurement» 
process, associated with the observational philosophy known as Bohr's 
«complementarity».  
 Other chapters of today physics involve types of «magnitudes» that 
escape the usual standards for physical quantities and are nevertheless quite 
powerful, and from which one gets as much intelligibility as in the usual classical 
cases. But these magnitudes are regarded generally as purely «formal» or 
«mathematical» ones, without direct physical counterparts. On the contrary, 
magnitudes in the usual, classical and traditional sense, such as coordinates on a 
trajectory, may have no definite physical content. What, then, is physical in such 
cases ? and significantly physical, considering the theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon ? Would it not be more appropriate to consider as physical what is 
theoretically  meaningful (and corroborated by phenomena, experiments, etc.), 
even if it was originally introduced in a pure formal way ?  
 Many examples of such transformations of content and signification 
through extension of meaning can be found in the history of physics and of 
mathematics (think only the extension of the concept of number, from integers to 
fractionals, to real and to complex numbers), and we can consider as well with the 
above point of view some genuine problems posed by various areas of present 
physics. In quantum physics, one describes states as linear superpositions of 
«eigenstates», functions or vectors (defined in Hilbert spaces), and magnitudes  
characterizing them (called «observable quantities») as linear operators acting on 
such states. These are the theoretical tools to deal with physical quantum 
processes, when, on the other hand, the data relative to measured quantities are 
only used to fill in and determine the components of these «functions» or 
«forms».  
 In the study of dynamical systems, although the theory is fully 
deterministic in the classical sense, it cannot give any exact prevision for 
trajectories, due to the amplification of small variations of the given initial state. 
We are inclined to ask, for such a case, whether the physical meaning of trajectory 
coordinates is actually a most significant one, considering what theory can 
provide. Another domain for concerns of this kind would possibly be quantum 
cosmology, in need of a conciliation between the continuous field of general 
relativity, defined in the usual four dimension space-time, and a quantum 
behavior that ignores spacial specifications : could we legitimately (scientifically) 
imagine magnitudes having a structure adequate to this property ? What kind of 
physical magnitudes would it be ? How would it be physically legitimated ?  
 Considering that physical magnitudes expressed mathematically are 
legitimated by the intelligibility they provide, in conformity with physical reality 
as it is given from the experience of phenomena, we suggest the possibility to 
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extend the meaning of the concept of «physical magnitude», in such a way that it 
can include simply «quantum physical state» for the quantum domain, 
«attractors», orders of stability, or other structural property for the physics of 
dynamical systems, and further dimensions or topological properties for quantum 
gravity.  
 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICATION OF A PROPOSED EXTENSION OF MEANING  
OF THE CONCEPT OF «PHYSICAL MAGNITUDES» 
 
 The extension of meaning proposed above, if it is to be confirmed 
from an overall consistency62, would considerably simplify our understanding of 
the corresponding fields of knowledge. Such simplification would eventually be 
radical for the «interpretation problems». It would, as an immediate consequence, 
re-establish the use and meaning of the objects of a theory as description and 
representation. Consequently, it would allow to speak again about physics in 
terms of realism without being suspected to go back to the «old ways of 
thinking». But this, I think, we could have already known before, if we admitted 
that mental and symbolic description of the real (external) world is always 
indirect, as a «representation» of it. Indeed, the kind of realism we consider here 
is critical realism, that of symbolic constructions for the representations of 
«reality», and conceived as a programme for scientific elaborations63. 
 Let us first consider quantum states and magnitudes. As quantum 
theory, for instance, permits to explain so many sets of phenomena and to perform 
powerful models of them, it would be tempting to think of it as a fundamental 
theory about a given world of objects. Such is indeed the spontaneous way for 
physicists to practize it, although they get into problems when (but only then) they 
come to think about the transition from this quantum domain to the classical one, 
that of measuring apparatuses. The usual «standard» (copenhaguian) 
interpretation claims that there is no such thing as a scientific object (i. e. an entity 
endowed with properties) that would be a conceptually signified (signifié 
conceptuel) existing in the theory and that the conceptually signified (the so-
called «object» of the theory, or state of the system) exists only in relation with 
given (and optional) conditions of preparation for measurement.  
 But the practice of scientists working with quantum physics objects 
actually (and factually, even if it dares not explicitly do so concerning 
«philosophical» matters) against this standard interpretation, by elaborating a new 
objectivity conceived in a sense similar to the usual one, but making use of 
concepts and magnitudes that have a broader meaning than the classical ones. 
The essential epistemological modification has been, actually, an (implicit) 
extension of meaning of the concept of  physical magnitude or quantity, to entities 
that are not endowed with simple numerical values. 
                                            
62 See, for a more detailed discussion in this respect about the concept of «quantum physical 
state», Paty [1999b, in press, b].  
63 Paty [1988], in particular chapters 1 and 10 ; [1993], chapter 9.  
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 The notion of physical quantum state differs from the ordinary notion 
of physical state, that is generally brought to magnitudes directly observable by 
instruments governed by the laws of classical physics. It is true that a quantum 
state is only  indirectly accessible to experiment, but this does not deny the 
possibility to get knowledge of it. Magnitudes characterizing the state are as well 
not directly accessible, since they are not simply numerically valued. It is 
therefore necessary to conceive an extension of meaning of the concepts of 
physical magnitude and of physical state  beyond their classical acceptions.  
 This extension is legitimated by the phenomena, in an acception of 
this term that does not reduce them to their apprehension by perception, but that 
conceives them according to the understanding, that is to say to their capacity to 
be brought to our knowledge, and this is essentially realized by the very formalism 
of quantum theory. This explicit extension has been, actually, prepared by an 
implicit one that works in practice already. But it also has been guess quasi 
explicitly by quantum theoretical physicists that were turned towards the formal 
properties of the theory, such as Max Born, Werner Heisenberg, Paul Adrian 
Dirac, John von Neumann and others. In their works, classical physical 
magnitudes were substituted by «quantum magnitudes» that differed from the 
former by their formal expression. For example, non commutative q-numbers, as 
proposed by Dirac in order to replace ordinary c-numbers  would have 
immediately suggested an extension of meaning as the type we are suggesting64. 
But these pioneers did not however feel themselves authorized to propose from 
the start these formal constructions as directly conceivable as physical 
magnitudes, through a simple extension of meaning, because of the interpretation 
questions raised by then. Quantities of this kind remained merely mathematical, 
their relationship with physical phenomena being ruled by the 
«interprétation».The stumbling block was essentially the transition from the 
classical to the quantum, with the problem of measurement in the quantum sense. 
 To consider as physical magnitudes with the full meaning of the word 
quantities such as a quantum state vectors in the form of coherent linear 
superpositions and «observable operators» with probabilist eigenvalues, that 
means to leave up the tight connection, or even the identification, of properties 
with what is or can be measured, and to adopt a different notion of property, that 
refers to the system or state as it is intellectually built through a process of 
abstraction and theory elaboration that integrates factual data. Properties thought 
in that way are no more contextual and can be said intrinseque : such are, in this 
perspective, the properties of elementary quantum «particles» (photon, quark, 
etc…), and of quantum fields. 
 Such properties do not depend in any way on the circumstances of 
their observation, but they are reconstituted from experimental observations that 
provide values of quantities corresponding to contextual properties, with assigned 
probabilities measured by frequencies of events. In this respect, probabilities, far 
from being a limitation of knowledge, allow the determination, from the spectral 
                                            
64 Dirac [1926]. Cf. Mehra & Rechenberg [1982], vol. 4, p. 162 sq., Darrigol [1992].  
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distribution of their components, of these «intrinsic» or global magnitudes - which 
are actually the true worries of the theory.  
 It is possible, generally speaking, to refer the determination of 
properties to two distinct features of the relationship between theoretical 
magnitudes : those that correspond respectively to previsions (contextual 
properties) and to predictions (intrinsic properties). Previsions, in the case of 
theories we speak of, are contingent, simply probable or unassignable, and are 
limited to the characterization of numerically valued magnitudes ; while 
predictions correspond to intrinsic and structural theoretical features, carried by 
magnitudes of a more complex form, that integrate, with the help of functions (or 
amplitudes) of probability in the case of quantum physics, magnitudes of the first 
kind. Such a distinction could be met as well in phenomena of a very different 
type than those of quantum physics, such as those pertaining to the dynamics of 
non linear systems65.  
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